New York Speech in the Fight with Cochran, 1953

The party's record and the cause of the split talk

For the opportunity to speak once more to the New York local, which I spoke to for the first time nearly twenty-five years ago. The theme of my speech this afternoon is the history of the party, the falsification of party history, the political meaning of Cochranism and its social base, and the perspectives of the party's struggle.

The history of our party is the history of a consistent and uninterrupted fight for the program and perspective of the coming socialist revolution in the United States, without once making a single concession to American imperialism or to Stalinism, the two enemies we started out to fight twenty-five years ago. This year we will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of our party, and we can do it proudly, because there is not one single stain on our banner. I am here today to defend the twenty-five-year record of our party, and the leadership which has shaped and directed it from the beginning in unbroken continuity for a quarter of a century. I am here to defend that record against any attack from any source.

At the 1946 convention of the party, our revolutionary program and perspective were formally stated in the theses on the American Revolution. We defend these theses against any opponents from any quarter as the programmatic guide of the party in its struggle against American imperialism. Within the framework of endorsement of our twenty-five-year record and agreement on the theses on the American Revolution, we have had differences of opinion in the past on this or that proposal or action. We will no doubt have other such disagreements in the future. We have discussed these differences in a fraternal way and eventually resolved them. We never fought anybody. We never split with anybody except those who challenged the program and perspective and the record of the party in serving that program and perspective, and deserted the party because they no longer wanted to belong to it.

That will be the case also in the future, I am sure. And how can it be otherwise? Genuine revolutionists, hemmed in by a world of enemies, are privileged to differ and debate among themselves. They are not privileged to fight and to split. The party has always permitted differences of opinion and has never expelled anybody, not one single person, because of his opinion. But we have to remember that the Socialist Workers Party is a revolutionary party and never pretended to be anything else, and never asked anybody to join it on any other basis. And we try to keep people in the party on that basis.

As long as they remain revolutionists, they love the party and stay in the party and never think of leaving the party. But when they cease to be revolutionists, as some have in the past, we noted invariably that their attitude undergoes a complete and profound change toward the party. They begin to hate the party. The party becomes a prison for them, and they insist on breaking out, as many have done in the past.

The revolutionary party, if you want to know the real reason, and I have been told that there has been talk of split in the New York discussion. We did have a split in 1940, as some of you remember. But it couldn't be helped; there was a fundamental reason for it. Burnham was a sick man when he took up arms against the party in 1939 and induced his dupe, Shachtman, to join him in the split in 1940. Burnham was a sick man. He had a bad case of Stalinophobia, which is the starting point of social patriotism in modern times. I think he also had a touch of Cannonphobia, but I didn't really hold that against him, because I gave him plenty to froth at the mouth about before I got through with him.

Our fundamental explanation of the 1939–40 fight, made at the time, not at the beginning but in the course of the fight, has been confirmed to the hilt by the subsequent evolution of the contending factions. Burnham openly joined the imperialist camp within a few months after he split from our party. The Shachtmanites went through a slower evolution, but they also arrived at the position of social patriotism, masked by the formula of the third camp. And that's where they are today, in the third camp of social patriotism.

Both sides in the present conflict seem to recognize that this conflict also cries out for a fundamental explanation. Nothing less will do if Trotsky was right when he said in 1939 that every serious faction struggle in the party is in the final analysis a reflection of the class struggle. And I think he was right. If the seriousness of the present fight is to be measured by its intensity, by its factional antagonism and animosity, which comrades have described to me as frenzy, at least in New York, then it seems to me that it is high time to pass over from the discussion of incidents, details and secondary matters to a consideration of Trotsky's formula of 1939, and to ask what is the basic cause of all this factional frenzy that has seized the organization in New York. What is the cause of this open talk of split? What class forces are contending here, and who represents which?

The document of the Cochranites, which is called, I think, The Roots of the Party Crisis, but which ought to be called the 1953 edition of The War and Bureaucratic Conservatism, gives one answer, which I will consider. My answer to the basic causes of the conflict is different, and I will explain why.

Their document says, and I quote, "Behind the present struggle is the shadow of the third world war." That's correct, but it doesn't help much. It is merely a statement of fact, the same statement that was made in The War and Bureaucratic Conservatism. It's a statement of fact which nobody can deny. But the world situation at the moment did not fall from the sky. It grew out of a long chain of preceding circumstances, which we are accustomed to cite and to analyze in explaining the present world crisis, which is due to explode in war and revolution.

The present party crisis didn't fall from the sky either. It also has grown up out of preceding events and objective circumstances, the accumulated effect of which is the factional explosion. These preceding and causative objective factors ought to be considered at the present time. When they are added up together in all their accumulated power and immensity, their effect on the party, registered by the factional conflict, loses all element of surprise. The surprise is only that the party crisis didn't come sooner and strike deeper. I personally think that the subjective factor, the factor of leadership, had a lot to do with staving off the party crisis and reducing its dimensions when it finally arrived.

Five pressures on the party

The background of the present party crisis can be summarized in the following five points.

One, this party and its leadership have been under social pressures of such power, intensity, and unbroken continuity of duration as have never been withstood by any other revolutionary party in history. Beginning with the outbreak of the Second World War, nearly fourteen years ago, this party had to stand up against all the pressures of patriotic fury and intolerance which the government, the labor bureaucracy, and the press could bring to bear.

Two, the party had to fight for its revolutionary position in the trade union movement in Minneapolis against a united front of the AFL bureaucracy, the employers, the federal government, the Minnesota state government, the municipal police, a veritable army of imported gangsters, and the Stalinists. The party had to suffer defeat, in the sacrifice of its trade union positions, in defense of its revolutionary principles and its intransigent opposition to the war.

Three, the party had to stand up against the indictment, trial, conviction, and imprisonment of eighteen of its leading people in the midst of the Second World War.

Four, the party has had to maintain its revolutionary position and hold firm to its revolutionary perspective over an unbroken period of thirteen years of war and postwar prosperity. Thirteen years. This unprecedented economic boom has operated not only to conservatize the general mass of the American working class, but has also exerted its conservatizing and corrupting influence directly upon a section of our own party.

Five, during the past six years, the conservatizing and corrupting effects of sustained economic boom and prosperity have been supplemented by a reactionary witch hunt. This has brought the added pressure of intimidation to bear and has had its intended effects on the trade unions and, in a certain measure, on a section of our party.

All this, in broad outline, is the background of the present internal struggle and the source of its true explanation.

The Cochranite explanation: Stalinophobia

The Cochranites analyze the cause differently. We see the conflict as the overdue and unavoidable result of the objective circumstances which I have enumerated. Their approach is more subjective. They see the party conflict as a calamity which might have been avoided, but has been artificially forced upon the party by the malevolent design of individuals, and their main concern is to fix the blame.

Thus we are told, one, that the party leaders, with their inveterate factionalism and their abnormal and insatiable appetite for splits, provoked the struggle with the deliberate aim to make another split. And two, that the reason for this irrational conduct (I think they said irrational, didn't they?) is an illness which has beset the party leadership. The name of this illness, they say, is Stalinophobia. Now, that is a very bad sickness indeed. Stalinophobia turns into social patriotism as blood poisoning turns into gangrene.

And that's not all. Stalinophobia, as they tell it, has not broken out suddenly in the party. It has been raging in the leadership for a long time, and it has been determining their policy not since yesterday, not since last year even, but for years and years and years. From as far back, at the latest report that I have seen, as June 1940. That's party history as Cochran writes it. Just why the Cochranites stopped their historical excursions on that precise date of June 12–15, 1940 is not clear. Perhaps their research is not completed yet, and perhaps further revelations are yet to come of our Stalinophobia and our factionalism.

Certainly, I can inform them if they don't know it, that there's plenty of evidence of our attitude towards Stalinism and our faction fights earlier than 1940. I personally have left a trail a mile wide on this subject for twenty-five years hand running, ever since 1928. Look it up. I offer this information (shut the door, please) for the benefit and guidance of those members of the Cochranite research staff who may want to trace my factionalism and my hatred of Stalinism to their roots, for their roots are deep.

Meantime, I would like permission to place on the table for examination now some historical exhibits which the Cochranites have already introduced in evidence as proof of our Stalinophobia, back to June 12–15, 1940, but so far not one day earlier. Party history is very important, but it ought to be written honestly.

Falsification of party history

At one stage in the struggle of the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union, the struggle against the Stalinist degeneration, Trotsky found it necessary to take time out from the current political and ideological battle to restate, for the benefit of the Soviet youth, some of the true facts about the history of the party and the revolution which had been buried under the mud and filth of Stalinist lies. This endeavor of Comrade Trotsky to inform the Soviet youth of the truth of their party history took shape in a classic document called The Stalin School of Falsification. We published this work in the early days of our fight in this country, and many of our cadres were raised on it. It became a textbook for the education of our cadres and a mighty weapon in our fight against the Stalinist liars.

To my great regret, I have to take time out now to perform the same task about the history of our own party, which is the heir and successor of the Bolshevik party of Lenin and Trotsky, has been the most faithful and consistent representative of the principles of Lenin and Trotsky of any party in the whole world, and which moreover has recorded its own history more fully and more completely, with documentary verification, than any revolutionary party in the entire world. Our youth need to know the history of their own movement. They cannot learn to become Bolsheviks without studying this history, in which the basic principles have been demonstrated in action in their own country. We have to fight against the neglect and denigration of party history. And at this stage in our internal struggle, we have to take a little time out to fight against the falsification of that history.

In the Stalinist revised version of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and virtually all of the authentic leaders of the party and the revolution, the old guard of Bolshevism, are depicted as counterrevolutionists who acted as agents of imperialism even during the revolution and the civil war which they led and organized. That's the Stalinist version of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the new and revised version of the history of our party, compiled by Cochran and his research staff, the leaders of our party, the old guard who founded the party, who have led and organized the struggle of the party against the petty-bourgeois Stalinophobes, against the labor fakers, against the federal prosecutors and jailers, against the war and the cold war and the witch hunt, these same leaders are depicted as nothing but Stalinophobes themselves. And thereby, here I quote literally from page 10 of The Roots of the Party Crisis, "a transmission belt for alien class influences into the party."

The June 1940 discussion with Trotsky in Mexico

The first exhibit in support of this framed indictment deals with our discussion with Comrade Trotsky in Mexico City on June 12–15, 1940. Since I was a participant in that discussion, and since I am named in the indictment to which I plead not guilty, and since I am deeply determined that party history shall be told honestly and not falsified, I am taking this, the first occasion that has been offered to me, to tell the truth about that meeting and its aftermath. If my speech is unduly long, I'll ask you to take that into consideration and bear with me, because this is the first chance I've had. I will summarize my comment, which I will later elaborate at length in writing in the internal bulletin, under a number of points which I will enumerate slowly enough to be taken down and noted.

Point one. The question of our tactics in the fight against Stalinism was raised by me in that discussion, as the rough stenogram shows. I wanted to bring out, in the presence of numerous other comrades present, the views of Comrade Trotsky, in the hope that they might be helpful to us, as his opinions always had been in the past. But Stalinism as a political movement was not the main item of our discussions with Comrade Trotsky on that occasion. And we had no fight with Trotsky about Stalinism. And we did not part as factional opponents, as it is represented. We parted in agreement, friendship, and mutual confidence.

Point two. The main topics of our political discussion with Comrade Trotsky on that occasion were the perspectives of the Second World War and America's part in it, the proletarian military policy, the strategy and tactics in the post-split struggle with the Shachtmanites, the trade union question under war conditions, and the stabilizing influence of a central party leadership having close connections with the cadres in the field and enjoying their confidence. The discussion on some of these questions, which we had placed on the agenda, were recorded in rough stenogram for further study. Others were off the record. Still other questions were discussed only in private conversations between Comrade Trotsky and me.

Now, it is possible that I was mistaken, but I got the definite impression when we left Mexico City, the same impression that Trotsky had given me many times before, not only in words but in actions which all could see, that he had the greatest confidence in the leading staff of our party. As I can testify over a period of thirteen years of such collaboration, he was a loyal collaborator. He never stabbed us in the back.

Point three. The main purpose of our visit, however, was not any one of these political discussions, nor all of them together. The main purpose of our visit in June 1940 to Mexico City was the question of the Stalinists, not as a political movement, but as a gang of terrorists and murderers. This charming characteristic of the Stalinists seems to have been forgotten lately, but we haven't forgotten it. Only a few weeks before, in the month of May, the Stalinists had staged an armed attack on Trotsky's household and made a determined attempt to assassinate him and Natalia.

We in New York responded to that attack by reflex action. Comrade Dobbs and I made immediate preparations to go down there as soon as it was technically possible, to check the situation and see what we could do for the protection of Comrade Trotsky's life. The main purpose of our visit was the discussion of a plan to fortify the house, to strengthen the guard, and to provide every possible physical and technical safeguard of the house. In the course of the discussions, we worked out and agreed upon a plan. And as soon as we returned to New York, we subordinated everything else to the not so easy task, at that time, of raising the thousands of dollars necessary to execute the plan of fortifying the house and increasing the guard.

Point four. We did disagree with Comrade Trotsky about the proposal to give critical support to Browder in the election. I don't know whether we convinced him or not. But I do know that he did not insist on his proposal, and told me in a personal conversation that he would not raise any part of the question of Stalinism as a political movement for discussion in the party at that time, and that he would leave it to the leadership to work out some kind of an approach to the Stalinist workers, who were far more numerous than they are now, by united front tactics and so forth.

Trotsky never gave us any orders on that occasion or any other. All the talk and all the chatter of the Shachtmanites and the rest of our enemies about our movement being a mere personal appendage of Trotsky, and about the leaders being mere jumping jacks who took orders and executed them without thinking, all that was false. There was not a trace of Cominternism in our relations with Comrade Trotsky in thirteen years of loyal collaboration.

Point five. The misleading introductory note to the stenogram of this discussion, published in Internal Bulletin No. 10, refers to it as a hitherto unpublished discussion with Leon Trotsky. A hitherto unpublished discussion, which is finally revealed to the party members thirteen years later as a result of some marvelous research and detective work. Now that statement, that it's a hitherto unpublished discussion, I am sorry to say is a misrepresentation of fact, which might give newer members of the party the false impression that the discussion was suppressed. That's not true.

In the first place, the stenogram was not meant for publication. It was taken only at our request for further study and for the information of those members of the National Committee who had not been able to participate. In the second place, the "suppressed" stenogram was mimeographed and circulated to the members of the National Committee at the time. And thirdly, I made a full and honest report of the discussion to the combined plenum and active workers' conference at Chicago in October, two months later, a conference which was attended by nearly half the party membership.

And that's not all either. My speech at the Active Workers' Conference, incorporating this report, and the resolution adopted by the convention on Stalinism and the united front on the basis of my report of our talk with Trotsky, was published in the Socialist Appeal of October 19, 1940. I repeat the date, October 19, 1940. My speech reporting this discussion quite fully and completely honestly was published together with a resolution of the plenum conference. I intend to republish this speech and resolution in the internal bulletin in the further course of the discussion, so that the young members of the party can read them and judge for themselves whether any opinions of Comrade Trotsky were suppressed, and whether we had any real conflict with him on the question of Stalinism as a political movement.

I'm going to republish this material. No matter how much time it takes, and here I make a promise to the party, no matter how much time it takes, and no matter what other important things have to be neglected, I am determined for my part that the history of our party shall be told straight and true. For to falsify party history means to poison the well from which the young party members have to drink.

Point six. One has only to read my speech at the plenum and active workers' conference to see that I gave a faithful account of the discussion with Trotsky, slurring over nothing and concealing nothing. I even mentioned my subsequent personal conversation with the old man about the matter. He told me, as I reported in my speech at the conference, that he would not make an issue or start a discussion about the question, because that wasn't the main question of our politics at that time, but did urge that we try to work out some kind of an approach to the Stalinist workers. He had raised that question earlier. That was no surprise. In his book In Defense of Marxism you can see references to it in the articles he wrote, that we had to turn our attention to the Stalinist workers and their new turn. My conference speech, moreover, and the plenum resolution published at the time in the Socialist Appeal, and the data I have given you, show that we did adopt a positive policy of united front and approach toward the Stalinist workers, and came out for the defense of Browder and Bridges against the government prosecution.

Why the united front with the Stalinists failed, 1940–45

Point seven. It is true, and this I must confess, it is true that the united front approach that we worked out at the October plenum and active workers' conference in 1940, the united front approach to the Stalinists, suffered a certain interruption a few months later. But that was not our fault, and I offer this not as an alibi but as an explanation of facts which may have been forgotten.

A few months later, our Minneapolis trade unionists (who had been under discussion in Comrade Trotsky's remarks there, and that part is carefully printed, because despite the fact that it's not related to our discussion of Stalinism, it is thrown in and added to the publication of the "suppressed" testimony. What for? Could it be to throw a smear over the trade unionists in Minneapolis, whereas Trotsky said the trade union elements historically have constituted the right wing of the party? I can't see any other reason for reprinting that part of the stenogram at the present time). But the Minneapolis trade unionists turned out, under the test of fire, not merely the test of water but the test of fire, to be not right-wingers, as trade unionists often become, but genuine revolutionists. Trotsky's fears proved to be unfounded.

The Minneapolis trade unionists affiliated to our party got into a fight with Daniel J. Tobin, the president of the Teamsters International Union, over his attempt to push the Minneapolis Teamsters Union into line for the war. We were opposed to the war, and the Minneapolis trade union has supported the party line. That's what the fight with Tobin was about. Now, the Stalinists were also opposed to the war at that time. But that did not prevent them from openly supporting Tobin in the fight against us. They formed a united front against us in that fight in Minneapolis. They howled against us and went over into the service of Tobin and acted as stool pigeons and finger men for him, and supplied him with arguments and editorial material for his fight against us in the Minneapolis trade union fight.

Now how, under those circumstances, I ask you, could we have a united front with the Stalinists on that occasion? The united front was disrupted. Our attempted united front was not made. We couldn't even write a letter and say, "Dear reformed and regenerated Stalinists, let's make a united front against Tobin," because they were already in Tobin's camp.

Point eight. The Minneapolis Teamsters locals seceded from the AFL and joined the CIO. The Stalinists were also, this is strange, they were also supporting the CIO in Minnesota. That was their whole base, as against the AFL. And we, in the course of the fight, seceded and joined the CIO. And what did the Stalinists do? Why, the Stalinists controlled the CIO and openly solidarized with the AFL fakers in the fight against them. That, unfortunately, placed another obstacle in the way of the united front with the Stalinists at that time.

Point nine. (Hope you're getting them by serial number.) Point nine. Additional difficulties were put in the way of our united front policy toward the Stalinists when, we say, it never rains but it pours, a few weeks later we were indicted by the federal government under the Smith Act. That's remembered, I take it. Now, the Stalinist betrayers at the time of our indictment in 1940, I think it was June, had not yet been told that they could no longer betray. Or if they heard it, they didn't believe it. Because they applauded our indictment by the federal government. They applauded our trial, our conviction, and our imprisonment. And they even campaigned against any financial support from the unions for our legal defense.

Now, we have to plead guilty to the accusation that we didn't follow out a very effective united front policy with the Stalinists in these instances. How could we? Was it our fault? Well, we couldn't agree upon the issue for the united front, for joint action. Their united front was with the AFL fakers, the employers and the government. And I don't think it would be fair, even if we were Stalinophobes on other occasions, revealed or yet to be revealed, I don't think it would be fair to accuse us of Stalinophobia because we refused to join this united front against ourselves in the Minneapolis case.

Point ten. The same day that we were sentenced to prison after our conviction, same day, just happened so, the United States formally declared war. The Stalinists promptly announced support of the government. We couldn't make a united front with them on that issue because we were against the war. Then, for the entire period of the war, four years, the Stalinists supported the no-strike pledge and the incentive pay plan to speed up the workers, and engaged in a general program of strikebreaking, fingering the militants for the FBI. Four years, no united front with the Stalinists. We couldn't make it on that ground, because that wasn't our policy.

And if one wants to give an honest account of why our projected united front policy with the Stalinists, which we proclaimed in 1940 at our active workers' conference, couldn't be carried out, and thinks the time has come to fix the blame, he ought at least to take into account these facts I have cited. Or if they're not facts, I'd like to have them refuted, and state plainly wherein we were at fault for the failure to make a united front, and why. And while he's at it, he might also explain, if he can, wherein the Stalinists were right, and why.

Stalinism then and now

Point eleven. The statement in the "GC introduction." That's the way it's signed, isn't it? GC? I don't know what it stands for. Hmm? Oh, I thought it stood for general confusion. I didn't know.

Frank is violating Rule 7. You know how that reads? Don't heckle an old stock boxer [?].

Point eleven. This GC introduction makes the statement that the relevancy of some of the important issues now in dispute in the party justifies its publication now. That it has relevancy to our discussion at the present time about the Stalinists and our approach or attitude toward them. That's also a misrepresentation which might mislead and deceive people who are not familiar with the great differences between the Stalinist position in the labor movement of that time and today.

The stenogram shows, and I hope everybody will read it attentively if they've not already done so, that we began by acknowledging the strong position of the Stalinists in the labor movement at that time as our problem. That's what I said, the first words, I believe. The Stalinists are our problem. I stated in the opening discussion, quote, "that the Stalinist party still has a powerful cadre of militants. It has a strong trade union machine which draws the workers." They were really fooling the militant workers then with their antiwar line, and were indeed our problem. They dominated a rather formidable movement based on antiwar sentiments expressed through the American Peace Mobilization and through the officialdom and press of a powerful trade union apparatus which they then controlled.

In 1940, if I had time, I could read at length the unions and central CIO councils controlled by the IWW [?]. They controlled virtually the whole maritime front. They controlled the transport union. They controlled the electrical workers. They controlled 45 percent of the auto workers. They controlled the CIO central councils in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Frisco, and almost every other important one throughout the country. They were indeed powerful and were indeed a problem. It was the mass strength of the Stalinists which determined the great interest that their movement had for us in June 1940, at the time of our discussion with Trotsky, rather than any political virtues which neither Lenin [?] nor Trotsky ascribed to them.

Now I say they haven't got this mass strength today. And as for their political virtue, I don't see, personally, I may be wrong, if so you correct me, but I personally don't see how the political virtue of the American Stalinists could have been improved between 1940 and the present time by the long years of jingoism, strikebreaking, and stool-pigeoning in which their cadres were conditioned throughout the whole period of the war, and our simultaneous prosecution and imprisonment. And all that, of course, is not to say that the Stalinist movement, even in its present bedraggled state, is of no interest whatever for us. It has an interest, but a decidedly secondary one, which is by no means comparable or relevant, as the GC introduction says, to the interest that this question had for us in June 1940.

Point thirteen. Our estrangement from the Stalinists after our discussion with Comrade Trotsky, our merciless denunciation and exposure of these traitors and scoundrels, which contributed so much to their discreditment, had nothing whatever to do with sentiments of Stalinophobia. It was not because, as we are accused, we had become a transmission belt for alien class influences into the party, as is slanderously alleged against us on page 10 of the Cochranite indictment in The Roots of the Party Crisis, the 1953 edition of The War and Bureaucratic Conservatism. Perhaps I should qualify that, in the interest of accuracy, by saying a very deteriorated and inferior version.

The real reason was that the Stalinists were aggressively fighting on the side of the American imperialists on every front, and we were aggressively fighting against the imperialists and their labor-faker and Stalinist agents on the picket line in Minneapolis, in the courtroom, in prison, in our press, in all our activity everywhere. There was no united front. There was no cooperation throughout that whole period, because there was no basis for it. We were not, to borrow a modern expression, in the same class camp. That's all I've got to say for the present about the 1940 revelation. I'll have more to say in the internal bulletin.

The 1947 "auto crisis"

Now I go over to the second count in the indictment for Stalinophobia brought against us. It relates to the discussion on auto policy in the August 1947 plenum of the National Committee, which I now hear designated for the first time, nearly seven years later, as the "auto crisis." My hearing is not good, but I didn't hear it called that.

Under discussion on this occasion at the plenum of August 1947 was the proposal to shift our critical support from the Reutherite fakers, whom we had supported in the 1946 convention a year before, to the Thomas–Addes group of fakers, in which, as the indictment says correctly, the Stalinists were involved. It says in the indictment on page nine, quote, "The proposal was violently opposed by Comrades Mills, Swabeck, Dunn, with Comrade Cannon giving them support until the very end of the discussion, when it had become obvious that the majority of the plenum was going to support the position of Comrade Cochran and the auto fraction. And then Cannon," as the report says, "as is so invariably the rule in Cannon's procedure" (this is my interpolation), "announced he would go along with the decision." Unquote.

Now, comrades, watch their operation closely. For as the carnival magician says, the hand is quicker than the eye. Here we have tied together at the scene of a monstrous crime, Stalinophobia, not one, not two, but all three of the degenerate old guard of the party, Swabeck, Dunn, and Cannon. And just to cinch things up and make an absolutely airtight and foolproof case, these three, Swabeck, Dunn, and Cannon, are linked with Mills, who was also at the scene of the crime and has since left the party.

Then it gets better as it goes along. Having identified the criminals in this phony auto crisis by name and association, the indictment goes on to characterize their conduct by analogy as the same as that of Burnham and Shachtman in the real auto crisis of 1939. I quote, these are not my words: "This is more than a coincidence," says The Roots of the Party Crisis. "In both cases," that is, the real auto crisis of '39 and the phony auto crisis of '47, "in both cases a section of the leadership oriented themselves from Stalinophobe considerations against the policy of the auto fraction."

Well, one has to admire clever. And I must admit, that's one reason why W. C. Fields is so popular on the screen. He was such an inveterately clever con man. This is a really impressive job of prestidigitation, calculated to startle uninformed party members and set them to gaping like yokels at a county fair. Consider how much has been tied up in one package in a few short sentences. Stalinophobia, Mills, Burnham and Shachtman, and all three of the old guard party leaders, Swabeck, Dunn, and Cannon, all in one package deal.

In journalistic circles there's a name for this kind of writing. In the publishing empire of Henry Luce, the master of Time, Life and Fortune, it is known as slick journalism, but the journalists themselves call it, roughly, crooked journalism. There is a saying among police and prosecutors who are engaged in frame-ups against helpless criminals every day in the week: don't prove too much. You may leave some loose ends which can unravel your whole case. And there is a rule of Anglo-Saxon law, designed to protect defendants against perjurers, which says that if the testimony of a witness is proved to be false on one essential point, the jury has the right to disregard the whole of his testimony. Unfortunately for this Cochranite case of the phony auto crisis, it also proves too much. And it also includes testimony which is demonstrably false.

The indictment was carelessly concocted, without regard to the fact that the discussion of the auto question in 1947 left a trail of evidence in the plenum and the political committee. As in the Mooney case, there was a trail of evidence that the framers neglected to check and which exposed their case. The indictment makes allegations which are refuted by the record of the political committee and the plenum.

I will summarize my answer to this second count in a false indictment also in a number of points, which I will enumerate slowly enough to be taken down, if anybody's interested in taking them down.

Point one. The question of the Stalinists was only one factor in the discussion at the 1947 plenum, and not the main one. That's point one. You wouldn't know that from reading The Roots of the Party Crisis. The main question at issue in the discussion was the factual question as to which way the main mass of the non-Stalinist militants were lining up in the UAW pre-convention fight. In the 1946 convention they had practically all supported Reuther on the issue of the GM strike the previous year, and we had gone along with them. That was our main line of tactics in the union, to go with the non-Stalinist militants. The question at the 1947 plenum was: were the non-Stalinist militants, who are our main field of work, switching in their decisive majority or not? Were they switching from Reuther to the Thomas–Addes–Leonard group of fakers? That was a factual question, which the plenum did not feel competent to answer, and wanted more information from the auto comrades in the various localities.

Point two. The indictment says on page nine that Cannon switched over to the majority and then, quote, "the correct decision was taken." Now that's not what the minutes of the plenum say. The plenum took no decision at all on auto policy in August 1947. The minutes show that the decision was deferred, pending further factual information from the auto conference, which was scheduled to meet in Detroit a day or two after the plenum. The minutes of this plenum, which is cited in the indictment, of August 1947, show that only one motion on the auto question was presented and carried, and I quote that motion from the minutes. The minutes read as follows. "Motion by Cannon. One, the discussion of policy on the auto union is to be continued in the National Committee on the basis of more complete factual information to be supplied by the auto comrades in all localities as to the composition of the two main caucuses and the strength of the Stalinists, numerically and strategically. Decision on our tactics at the convention is deferred pending this further discussion."

That's what the minutes say. Point two of the motion: "The party fractions should adapt their tactics in their local unions to the concrete local circumstances." You know what that meant? That meant they should stay in either caucus according to local circumstances, and in fact they did. In Chicago and other places they were in the Reuther caucus, and the plenum told them to stay there. That was point two of the plenum decision. And point three was that Cochran should represent the National Committee as a reporter at the auto conference. Motion carried. That's all, the whole record of the August plenum on this so-called auto crisis.

Point three. After the reports and discussion subsequent to the auto conference, the evolution of the question left more evidence in the minutes of the political committee of September 13, nearly a month later. In the meantime, Reuther had stepped up his red-baiting campaign, and negotiations had been conducted with the Thomas–Addes leaders over questions of program and our participation in their caucus. This meeting of the political committee of September 13 adopted a resolution with ten votes for, plus the consultative vote of one alternate, and none opposed. Ten for, one alternate in favor, none opposed. That is a unanimous decision of the political committee made a month later, and this decision was that our fraction should orient toward support of the Thomas–Addes caucus at the coming UAW convention.

And it gave as its reasons, what do you think? Those of you that have read this indictment and heard nothing but tendentious [?] and false reports about it, what do you think was the reason the political committee decided to go into the Thomas–Addes caucus? Was it the importance and necessity of snuggling up to the Stalinists, to which the Stalinophobes had been so violently opposed? Was that the reason? Not on your tintype. That's not what the PC resolution says, as recorded in the minutes of the political committee for September 13, 1947. Just the contrary.

The adopted resolution listed four points as reasons for the orientation toward the Thomas–Addes–Leonard bloc. The first reason was Reuther's combination with the reactionary Catholic outfit, the ACTU, and their increasing hostility toward us, as well as all radicals in the union. That was the clear beginning of the red-baiting lineup, and the party's clear lineup in opposition to it.

The second reason was the danger of the Reuther–Catholic bloc getting a monopoly of leadership in the union and stifling democracy in the union. A very important point, and for me the decisive one. The decisive one. Because if the old situation of a balance of power between the Thomas–Addes–Leonard group on one side and the Reuther bunch on the other should be broken in favor of the monopoly of one, it was obvious that democracy, which we had enjoyed as a result of the balance of power, would be reduced. That was, for me, the main reason for going over to the Thomas–Addes bloc, to try to prevent this monopoly.

The third reason, I quote, was "the overall more progressive character and militant composition of the Thomas–Addes group and their demonstrated desire to cooperate and work with us. In their desperation they made big concessions to us on programs and on our participation, and we took advantage of it." And this motion here, where it states, after a month of investigation and development and reports from the auto comrades in the field, that the militant composition of the Thomas–Addes group was more favorable, was a settlement of the factual question as to what was the composition of these two caucuses, which the plenum had refused to decide because it didn't feel it had enough information a month before.

Now, there was one more reason, the fourth and final reason why the political committee made that unanimous decision a month after the auto conference for supporting the Thomas–Addes bloc. What do you think was the fourth and final reason? The strength and influence of the Stalinists, and the importance of an alliance or an approach to them, which had been inhibited by previous Stalinophobia? I'm sure that's the impression that everybody who read this report has got. That's not what the resolution says. Just the contrary.

The fourth and final reason of the political committee resolution calling for an orientation to the Thomas–Addes bloc reads literally as follows in the minutes of the political committee of September 13, 1947. I quote: "The decline of Stalinist strength and influence and their virtual absence from the top councils of the Thomas–Addes group." Not the strength of the Stalinists, not the overall necessity of getting in there to have contact with them, but the decline of the Stalinist influence and strength in the caucus and the top circle. That's the reason given for the decision of the political committee to go into the Thomas–Addes caucus.

That's the way, and those were the reasons why the phony auto crisis of 1947 was resolved by unanimous vote of the political committee, and the frightful monster of Stalinophobia was laid to rest and never mentioned in the subsequent three conventions of the party, never mentioned or hinted at until it recently came to life again, like Rip Van Winkle after a seven-year sleep.

But that's not all yet on the phony auto crisis. These are only the blossoms. The berries are yet to come. Point four. There were still further developments in our alliance with the Thomas–Addes–Leonard Stalinist bloc. There were still further developments in this bloc, which is represented here as the historical turning point in the life-and-death struggle of the embattled proletarian wing of the party against the old guard "transmission belt for alien class influences into the party." What happened to that history-making bloc after the 1947 convention? There are traces of its further evolution in the minutes of the political committee, which the framers of the indictment against us neglected to check.

In the minutes of November 18, 1947, there is a report on the UAW convention by Cochran, which is summarized in about a thousand words of stenogram. And this report of a thousand words on the UAW convention devotes one sentence, and that's the last sentence in the thousand-word report, to the Stalinists, and reports as follows, quote: "The Stalinists are a waning force and have little influence in the top councils of the Thomas–Addes caucus." The Stalinists, who were represented as the occasion for the main orientation which [inaudible] established in 1947 [?].

The PC minutes record another report from Cochran on post-convention activities in the auto union and the attempts to organize the general opposition into caucuses in Flint and Detroit after the convention. Now, did we hunt up the Stalinists first to make sure they would all be present at the caucus meeting? That's not what Cochran's report says. I quote from the report as follows, quote: "The CP people were deliberately kept out of preliminary caucus meetings." That's what Cochran's report of our work in Flint and Detroit says, after the convention, when they were gathering up opposition caucuses: the CP people were deliberately kept out of preliminary caucus meetings. Now just consider that, comrades. The Stalinists were deliberately kept out of the caucus meetings which we were helping to organize. Now what was that? Was that Stalinophobia in Detroit and Flint? Not at all. It was just plain horse sense and realistic tactics in our struggle for influence in the opposition circles against the Stalinists.

Point six. The Thomas–Addes–Leonard bloc. The Thomas–Addes–Leonard Stalinist bloc. The bloc that shook the world in 1947 and is now shaking the SWP. This bloc didn't last long as an opposition in the auto union, but that was neither the fault of the old guard Stalinophobes and transmission belts, nor of Cochran and the other St. Georges who have recently, so very, very recently, discovered the Stalinophobe dragon and raised their lances against it.

Right after the convention, Addes left the auto union and opened a saloon. And he had nothing more to offer us but refreshments. That was one man down and two to go. A couple of weeks later, Thomas, who was supposed to become the leader of the opposition to the Reuther regime, was put on Murray's payroll in the CIO and taken out of the auto union altogether. That was two men down and one to go. But we still had Leonard. And Leonard was designated as the formal leader of the opposition to Reuther. Well, what happened to him? A few weeks later Murray put him on the payroll, and he was taken out of the auto union, and that was three down and none to go. Leonard, the last one, was put on Murray's payroll at Reuther's demand and taken out of the situation.

Leonard was sent out to the West Coast as a CIO representative, and in that capacity he organized and supervised the purge of the Stalinists from the Industrial Union Councils of the CIO in San Francisco, Los Angeles, the California State CIO, and any other locality in the West where he could find them. He was the official purger of the Stalinists and other radicals in the West under the Murray regime. I think the world will little note nor long remember. It's a long jump from Lincoln to Leonard, isn't it? The world will little note nor long remember these red-baiting excursions of the noble Leonard. They are worth mentioning only to add the final ironic touch to the fearsome accusation that the hesitation of such revolutionists as Vincent Dunn and Arne Swabeck to line up with the bloc of Leonard, Thomas and Addes is proof that such revolutionists as Arne Swabeck and Vincent Dunn had become, to quote again from The Roots of the Party Crisis on page 10, Stalinophobes and "a transmission belt for alien class influence into the party."

The Korean War charge

The third count in the indictment of the party leadership for the high crime of Stalinophobia relates to our policy in the Korean War. The first reaction of the weekly paper, says the indictment, was a third camp position. That's not true. The third camp position is only a hypocritical formula, invented and copyrighted by the Shachtmanites for support of the imperialist camp, as anyone can see for himself by reading the Shachtmanite press. The Shachtmanite third campers are social patriots, and it is a slander of our editors and our political committee to say that they were third campers at any time, even for a couple of weeks or a couple of days or a single minute.

But after this foul charge has been hurled, in the first sentence of this count in the indictment, the authors try to crawl out of responsibility without withdrawing the charge. And their method of doing this is another example of that odious technique of slick journalism, otherwise known as crooked journalism.

I was in Los Angeles at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. I had nothing to do with the first issues of the paper after the outbreak of the war. But I'm dragged into responsibility, nevertheless, by the sly remark that the first errors disproved, quote, "Cannon's basic contention that the main danger came from tendencies toward conciliation with Stalinism." I wasn't there, but I was responsible just the same, because of this theory that they say I propounded. Now, incidentally, I never made that contention, that the main danger is conciliation with Stalinism. That's not what we've been fighting in our past faction fights. I never made that contention, but just to show there'll be no misunderstanding between us, I'll make the parenthetical remark, freely, without any pressure being put upon me, that I will never make peace nor compromise with Stalinist conciliationism.

The indictment then goes on to say, three years after the event, almost, quote, "It is true that the PC corrected its position in a relatively brief time under pressure of protest from leading comrades." Now that's a very slick sentence, isn't it? Here you've got fifty-six pages of indictment in which names are sprinkled like pepper on a sauce. But here's the Korean War, and the errors were corrected under protest of "leading comrades" only. What leading comrades? Who were they? Why this sudden lapse into anonymity when you're touching such a vital question of our attitude toward war?

The leading comrades who rendered such a great service on a momentous occasion must either have had no names, or their names were unknown, or (I cite this of course as a bare possibility) the comrades who helped to correct the line did have names, and their names were known to the authors of the framed indictment, but it was not convenient to name them. The framers of this indictment may possibly have faulty memory. They have given some evidence of this in other instances, notably in their recollections of the so-called auto crisis. But they are also skilled writers, and they know, as every journalist knows, that an article can be loaded and slanted as effectively by what is left out as by what is put in.

Comrades Price and Breitman, who were on the scene when the Korean War broke out, have filled in some of the omitted details, which give a somewhat different picture than the one drawn by Cochran and his research staff. I wasn't there. I don't say that as an alibi. I wasn't there. I was in Los Angeles, where I spend as much of my time as I can because I like it there. I like the party there. I was in Los Angeles, but it happened that I did have a remote hand in the discussion and settlement of the question of policy. And I mention this only because I'm smeared in the indictment by indirection, innuendo and omission, and I want to wipe off the smear.

It has already been proved against us, if you take accusation for proof in the fashion of McCarthy's Senate committee, that I have been a Stalinist foe at least since June 1940. I revealed this malignant disease again in the discussion over auto policy in 1947. And in June 1950, when the Korean War broke out, we were still discussing the question of the buffer zone in Eastern Europe. And my reluctance to characterize these countries as workers' states is cited as proof positive of double Stalinophobia on my part, as proof of my refusal to recognize anything new in the postwar world.

The indictment covering the Korean War question says one thing that is true, and for that reason is worth quoting in full. It says, quote, "The Korean War was the first big postwar crisis testing all prior conceptions." Unquote. That's true. And it could be strengthened by adding that the test was a hundred times more important for us because American imperialism was directly involved. It is in the attitude towards one's own government that the worth and seriousness of one's revolutionary positions is really tested. It's easy to be a friend of revolutions in other lands, but it's harder and more dangerous and more serious and more important to be a revolutionist in one's own country in time of war, especially if it's an imperialist country and the strongest and most ferocious in the world.

The outbreak of the Korean War was an overwhelming event, and it should be a matter of pride to the members of our party that the very first reflexive action of our president [?], according to Price and Breitman, who have written in the internal bulletin, some of the present sanctimonious saints and unsullied innocents were not entirely free from sin in this respect in the first days of the Korean crisis. I understand that's all been straightened out now by confession. I don't care about that. I don't care who was wrong as long as the line was changed.

How the Korean line was settled, July 1950

But however that may be, when we received the first issue of the Militant in Los Angeles, now I'm telling you a little history that hasn't been reported yet, which I never would have mentioned, and I've never mentioned for three years in the party, because I don't make a practice of talking about how we solve problems in the committee as long as they're solved, or going around boosting my own stock and telling all the things I did to straighten things out, to make myself appear big and others little. I don't do that. I don't need to. But it happened. When we received the first issue of the Militant in Los Angeles after the outbreak of the Korean War, we called a meeting of the NC members there to discuss the policy. We were dissatisfied with some of the analytical artists [?] and decided to make our opinions known right away.

We called Comrade Ward, who was then in charge of the office, on the long-distance phone and told him our opinion. He said he personally agreed with them, and that the weight of opinion in the PC was swinging in the same direction, and that he thought the line would quickly be straightened out. We said, all right, that's good. The next issue of the paper contained much improvement. But we in Los Angeles were still dissatisfied. We held a meeting of the NC members and drew up a memorandum of our position for policy on the Korean War. We again got Comrade Ward on the phone and proposed an immediate plenum to settle the policy.

It was discussed by the comrades in New York. Then Ward called us back to report their opinion that an immediate plenum was not technically feasible, but that if I would come to New York to explain the position of the Los Angeles NC members, they would call an enlarged session of the PC, which could include a number of NC members who were in town in addition to the regular PC, and others who were at the camp at the time. That was agreeable to us, and I took the first plane I could get and came to New York for that specific purpose and that only, three years ago in July.

The minutes of that special and large meeting of the political committee, held on July 20, 1950, show (now I'm giving you the history of the Korean War settlement from the record) that fourteen members were present. I submitted to that meeting the written memorandum of the Los Angeles NC members analyzing the war and proposing the line of policy. I took part in the extended discussion at that meeting, which was a special meeting. And with your permission, if you'll allow me a few minutes' time, which I'll gladly concede to the other side on their part, I would like to quote a few excerpts from the stenogram of my remarks at that meeting where the Korean War policy was settled, because they give a clear picture of what we in Los Angeles wanted.

Quote, from the stenogram of the PC meeting: "The Korean War is a part of the colonial struggle against American imperialism." Now this is not a written document. These are off-the-cuff remarks in the PC discussion. "We ought to have the same attitude as to China, even more sharply in this case, because the U.S. intervened directly. It seems to us this is one of the most important factors in the development of the world situation. Tremendous strength is demonstrated by this movement of the Asian people. They are by no means pulled on a string back and forth from Moscow. It is a real people's movement, and at present the most revolutionary factor in the world. We have to take an unambiguous attitude toward it. As things are shaping up now, it will manifest itself more and more as a movement of the Asians against American military force."

I continue quoting from my stenogram of my remarks at the meeting. "The correct demands are all stated in the paper here and there." This is the answer to the accusation that I denounced the editors as third campers. I state in my speech, "The correct demands are all stated in the paper here and there, but it is diffused too much and buried beneath the balancing of blame. These demands must stand out as the main center of our campaign. Get out of Korea. Get out of the Orient. Withdraw the troops. Let the Koreans settle their own affairs."

Continue quoting. "One thing is becoming clearer by the facts, and we are gradually learning and assimilating it after the Chinese experience. These are genuine revolutionary movements of great masses, of millions of people. The one misfortune is that they begin under Stalinist leadership everywhere. But if we make it a condition" (now this is a Stalinophobe talking, take it down) "if we make that a condition for withdrawing our support or blunting it with reservations, we will be doing in effect what the Shachtmanites do, and in an extreme sense. They always find reasons to abstain from struggle." I didn't say, as Price pointed out correctly, that's what you editors have been doing. I said, if we do that, that's what we will be doing. I don't like my remarks to be misquoted and turned upside down against honest comrades.

Not only that, I said further in my remarks: "These are genuinely revolutionary movements, which offer the greatest revolutionary potentialities in the whole world. They are developing a tendency toward independence. We learn something from the Yugoslav development. I doubt very much whether the Kremlin, by remote control, can manipulate these vast movements in Asia in a puppet sense." Who's talking there, Stalinophobes? "As American imperialism shapes up its blundering military program for the domination of the Orient, we will have to get away entirely from anything remotely suggesting a policy of plague on both your houses. There are tens and hundreds of millions of people involved in the colonial revolt. They may well be the decisive force which will upset the whole balance. We have to support all these movements" (now listen again) "we have to support all these movements regardless of the fact that they're led by Stalinism at the present stage. Insurrectionary movements in the Philippines, Indochina, China itself, Korea. We think it is necessary now, in the concrete case of Korea, to adopt a policy not merely as an incidental one for a day but as a pattern of our reaction to any further American adventures."

"We" there, I was speaking for the Los Angeles NC members. That's the line that I offered in the political committee. Now what happened? That's the paraphrase of the line of the Los Angeles resolution or memorandum which I presented. Now what happened at the PC meeting? At that PC meeting there was an extended discussion, very interesting, very fruitful discussion. The minutes show that twelve out of the fourteen members present took part in the discussion. The minutes show that there was no fight at that meeting of the political committee. There was no crisis, merely some shadings of emphasis on one side or another, some questions and explanations and so forth, as in every serious discussion.

The minutes show, and it's too bad, isn't it, that when you were writing about the history of our party in the Korean War you forgot to mention this, the minutes of that PC meeting show that the memorandum of the Los Angeles NC members was adopted by unanimous vote of fourteen members for and none against. And that the line of the paper from that day to this was laid down in the memorandum of the Los Angeles NC members, whom you try to say are Stalinophobes who don't understand new events. They're not interested in Korea and the colonial wars and everything else.

Well, I don't want to take advantage, but I'm full of material. Can you give me another half hour? [Laughter]

Now the PC minutes show that the Los Angeles memorandum on the Korean War was adopted by fourteen in favor and none against. I said there was no crisis. I didn't come in here and have to fight and argue and beat down a lot of people. There's nothing to it. By the time I got to New York the comrades in New York had a few weeks to think things out in this overwhelming new event, and the Los Angeles memorandum was accepted. There was no fight, there was no crisis, just a little clarification. And the Los Angeles memorandum was adopted.

The open letter to Truman

Now, that doesn't end the story, though. As a result of this decision, I was assigned to write the first open letter to Truman. That's not mentioned in the slur on me in your report on the Korean War and the implications that I was responsible for failing to take a revolutionary position. I was assigned to write the first open letter to Truman. That letter was written and published in the first period of patriotic frenzy over the war, at the risk of the most serious consequences. That letter showed the Socialist Workers Party in action against the war. And if the defamers of the party's record in the Korean War want to tell the truth about our policy, why didn't they quote that open letter to the President of the United States, written in the first weeks of the war when nobody knew what the consequences might be?

I can tell you where you can find it: in the Militant of July 31, 1950 [?]. And if you won't quote it, I'll quote it for you. A few sentences. A letter to the president and members of Congress, by me personally. Why did I write it personally? I'll tell you. I began to say that as a private citizen I disagree with your actions in Korea and I petition you to change your policy fundamentally, as follows: Withdraw the American troops and let the Korean people alone. I'm setting forth the reasons for this demand in detail in the following paragraphs. "But before opening the argument, I beg your permission, gentlemen" (I'm addressing the President and members of Congress) "I beg your permission, gentlemen, to tell you what I think of you. You are a pack of scoundrels. You are traitors to the human race. I hate your rudeness and your brutality. You make me ashamed of my country, which I have always loved, and ashamed of my race, which I used to think was as good as any. The American intervention in Korea is a brutal imperialist invasion, no different from the French war in Indochina," and so forth.

Then I went on to say: "It is true that the Kremlin seeks to take advantage of this struggle for its own reactionary ends, and would sell it tomorrow if it could get another deal with Washington. But the struggle itself has the overwhelming and wholehearted support of the Korean people. It is part of the mighty uprising of the hundreds of millions of colonial people throughout Asia against Western imperialism. This is the real truth, the real issue. The colonial slaves don't want to be slaves any longer. This is more than a fight for unification and national unity. It's a civil war. Whatever the wishes of the Kremlin, a class war has been unfolding in Korea."

And then I went on with the demands. The demands of our party: "The attempt to prop up the Syngman Rhee [?] regime by armed force is part of Wall Street's planned program to dominate and exploit the whole world. Your declared war on Korea, Mr. President, is a war of enslavement. The right in this struggle is all on the side of the Korean people. I call upon you to halt this unjust war in Korea. Withdraw all American armed forces, so that the Korean people can have full freedom to work out their destiny in their own way." That's part of the history of the party policy on the Korean War.

That letter. I read, in that debate with Dobbs that's printed in Bulletin No. 15, Cochran pompously declaring that the leaders of our party were unnerved by the cataclysmic events, overwhelmed by them. Well, there may be some question of nerve involved, but by God it was not my nerve, when I stuck my neck out with that challenge to the president and the Congress in the first days of the war. That letter was reprinted with acclaim [?] in the Stalinist [?] and Trotskyist press throughout the world as evidence of the revolutionary struggle of the American Trotskyists in the stronghold of their own imperialism. That's nearly three years ago. Three years ago, think of it. And a full year before the Third World Congress.

They tell us we don't understand the Third World Congress yet. We wrote the open letter to President Truman a year before the Third World Congress. We know what a colonial war was. We know what to say to American imperialists when it engages in it. The consistent week-by-week campaign of our militants since that time has been an inspiration to all parties of the Fourth International throughout the world, and has been regarded by them as a model of courageous and effective agitation against an existing war waged by the class enemy in our own country, and not mere chatter in a propaganda circle about war in general.

How could Stalinophobes, who are a transmission belt for alien class influences, carry on such a campaign for three years hand running, so consistently and aggressively for such a long time, in time of war, in the citadel of the most powerful and ferocious imperialism, at the risk of their own heads? How could they do it if they're transmission belts for alien class influences, if they're Stalinophobes, as you with your filthy slander throw in our face? Isn't war, and the attitude toward war in which one's own country is involved, the ultimate test of a revolutionist and his policy? Do we who stood up to this test at the risk of our heads have to go around explaining to some scholastic that we really understand what it means to be against imperialist war? And aren't leaders who stand up against that ultimate test as the leaders of the SWP have stood up worthy of support rather than denigration and slander? I'd like to ask the young members of the party that. Are leaders who stand up that way, and have stood up that way all their lives, worthy of support rather than denigration and slander?

Since that meeting of July 22 [?], 1950, and the publication of my open letter to President Truman a few days later, we have not heard one word of criticism from anyone in this country or any other country of the policy and conduct of our press on the Korean War, until a scurrilous and slanderous accusation was suddenly hurled at us in April 1953.